Senate Foreign Relations Committee

[kurdeng at aps.nl]

Subject: Re: Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Report On Turkey

---------------------- Forwarded from : mail06672 at pop.net ----------------------

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT ON TURKEY
(United States Senate - September 15, 1995)

[Page: S13655]

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, during the August recess two members of the
Foreign Relations Committee minority staff traveled to Turkey at my
direction to assess a range of issues related to United States-Turkish
bilateral relations. Turkey, one of the largest recipients of United States
military assistance, is an important United States ally in a dangerous and
unstable region. It is therefore, incumbent upon us to take a close look at
what is occurring in Turkey--the threats to its security, its political
struggles, and its human rights situation. In particular, I asked my staff
to focus on Turkey's Kurdish problem, which has broad implications for
regional stability, as well as Turkey's relations with the West.

Among the staff's findings is that the Kurdistan Workers' Party [PKK] poses
a grave threat not only to Turkey, but to regional stability as well. At
the same time, the Government of Turkey is unable--or unwilling--to
distinguish the genuine threat posed by the PKK from the legitimate rights
and aspirations of the Kurdish people. Turkey is responding with a
heavy-handed, indiscriminate military campaign against the Kurds, even as
it shuts off opportunities for nonviolent, Kurdish political expression.
Consequently, Turkey may be fomenting, rather than preventing Kurdish
separatism.

I believe this report makes an important contribution to the Congress'
consideration of the United States approach toward Turkey. I ask unanimous
consent that the `Summary of Key Findings' be placed into the Record at
this point, and would commend the full report, which is a available at the
Foreign Relations Committee office, to my colleagues' attention.

Summary of Key Findings

Turkey, which places a high priority on good relations with the West in
general and the United States in particular, is an important U.S. ally in a
dangerous and unstable neighborhood: Three of its immediate
neighbors--Iran, Iraq, and Syria--are on the U.S. list of state sponsors of
terrorism; it is engaged in an economic and political competition with
Russia for influence in and access to the resources of Central Asia and the
Caucasus; there is ongoing conflict to Turkey's north--in Georgia and
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey is not, however, a disinterested in
neutral party, it is openly sympathetic to Azerbaijan's position, and
although it has opened an air corridor to Armenia, Turkey maintains a road
and rail blockade; it continues to spar with Greece over Cyprus and other
issues, in particular, a dispute over maritime boundaries in the wake of
Greece's ratification of the Law of the Sea treaty threatens to bring
Turkey and Greece into outright conflict.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) poses a grave threat not only to Turkey,
but to regional stability as well. The PKK--which employs deadly terrorist
tactics against innocent noncombatants in Turkey and against innocent
civilians elsewhere in the Middle East and Europe--bears direct
responsibility for much of the tensions in southeast Turkey and for
prompting the recent Turkish invasions of Iraq.

Operation Provide Comfort, the allied humanitarian and security operation
in Northern Iraq, is a critical element of U.S. and Western strategies with
regard to Iraq, and may be the only thing preventing tens of thousands of
Kurds from pouring into southeastern Turkey. Although some Turkish
officials recognize these facts and military officials at Incirlik have
provided splendid cooperation to their British, French and American
counterparts, other Turkish military and political officials (including
parliamentarians) argue that Provide Comfort offers the PKK protection and
cover in Northern Iraq. This rather schizophrenic view of Provide Comfort
makes Turkey appear a relucant participant in the allied effort, which
Turkey has exploited to its advantage in dealings with its allies.

In keeping with traditions established during the days of Mustafa Kemal
Attaturk, Turkey has an almost paranoid fear of losing its Turkish
identity. The government of Turkey accordingly is unable--or unwilling--to
distinguish the genuine threat posed by the PKK from the legitimate rights
and aspirations of the Kurdish people. As a result, Turkey refuses to
engage in a political dialogue with nonviolent Kurdish representatives, and
is executing a heavy-handed, indiscriminate military campaign to eradicate
what it views as a monolithic threat to the unity of the country.

The city of Diyarbakir, which symbolizes the ethnic difficulties that
persist within Turkey, has become a haven for rural Kurds forced to
evacuate neighboring towns and villages destroyed by the Turkish military.
By some estimates, the city's population has grown from roughly 300,000 to
more than 1,500,000 during the past five years. Although Turkish officials,
local residents, and some independent observers suggest that tensions have
subsided during the past two years, it is evident that any existing calm is
tenuous and the result of Turkey's overwhelming--and at times
oppressive--security presence, which has exacted a high cost in terms of
human rights violations.

Turkey's government refuses even to acknowledge that there is a `Kurdish
problem,' and thereby is ignoring the real issue. By equating all Kurdish
aspirations with the terrorist designs of the PKK, Turkey effectively has
eliminated outlets for nonviolent Kurdish political or cultural expression.
As a consequence, Turkey unintentionally may be contributing to the PKK's
appeal.

Turkey desperately wants to join the European Union's Customs Union, and is
making some effort to meet the European Parliament's minimum demands
regarding democratization and human rights in order to achieve membership.
It may even make some modifications to Article 8 of the Anti-Terror law
(which prohibits the advocacy of separatism). Turkey will not, however,
take any action which it perceive as comprising the Turkish identity, so
there are limits to the amount of genuine change it will make to gain
membership in the Customs Union. It is equally unclear that the West would
have much impact on Turkish behavior by withholding benefits such as
Customs Union membership.

Despite claims that it regards fundamentalism as a threat to its secular
heritage, the government of Turkey appears to be encouraging and even
sponsoring Islamic activities in an attempt to bind the country together
and defuse separaist sentiment. Such a strategy--which parallels efforts of
governments in the Near East seeking to counter radical lefist groups
during the 1970s and early 1980s--could backfire and inadvertently provide
a foothold for Islamic extremists.


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