Interview with Kopietz about N-Irak

[stk at schism.antenna.nl]

This is an edited transcript of OutThere news service's live interview 
with Hans-Heino Kopietz, an independent security consultant and expert 
on Kurdish affairs, on Thursday September 5, 1996.

Paul Eedle, OutThere news service: Welcome to OutThere's
third live Net discussion on the crisis in Kurdistan. Today's guest
is Hans-Heino Kopietz, one of the world's leading experts on Kurdish
affairs.

Mr Kopietz is an independent international and security
consultant. He has had a long career as an academic and analyst. He
has lectured at the American University of Beirut, Ahmadu Bello
University in Nigeria and the School of Oriental and African Studies
in London. He has worked as a researcher and analyst at the
International Institute of Strategic Studies in London and as an
international affairs and security consultant at Control Risk Group.

Mr Kopietz's work and study have involved him closely in Kurdistan
for the last 15 years. He knows the key players personally and met
them all earlier this year during a visit to Iraqi Kurdistan when he
was reporting for German television.

Mr Kopietz, why do you think the Kurdish Democratic Party took the
risk of appealing for military help from the Iraqi government, which
it has been fighting on and off for nearly 30 years?

Heino Kopietz: This was not a risk. The KDP had negotiated
since August September 1995 with the central government of Iraq and
Mr Massoud Barzani's principle intention always has been to eliminate
the stronghold of the PUK led by Jalal Talabani. Without Iraqi
military assistance he could not do it. Further, Mr Barzani was well
aware of the US policy. He had advised the United States nine days
before the Iraqis came into Arbil, and he was told that he would not
in any way be bombarded by American aircraft. Instead the United
States would give comfort to him and to Baghdad.

Paul Eedle: Are you suggesting that the US connived in
Barzani's action against the PUK, then?

Heino Kopietz: Absolutely, absolutely.

Paul Eedle: Why - because the PUK had invited Iranian
support?

Heino Kopietz: The Iranian political and military presence
is minimal. Ideologically and religiously, the Iranians have never
made a big impact into Kurdistan because nearly 90 percent of
Kurdistan is Sunni, but four or six percent are Christians and
related faiths,and Iran doesn't have a chance of ever getting a
religious foothold in Kurdistan. It's a question of the Iranians
wanting to use political influence, which has nothing to do with
religion. It's a question of the PUK being identified as being
supported by Iran. So I would say yes, that's why the American
connived at Barzani's action. But there are other reasons too. It's
better for America to have ONE leader of Kurdistan and they have
decided to nominate Barzani because the Barzani family has an old
name in the 20th century as leaders of Kurdistan. The Americans are
more comfortable with traditions and traditional authority. Talabani
is so-called 'progressive'. He originally was a communist, a radical.
He's taciturn, unpredictable and vociferous. It's very difficult to
negotiate with Jalal and I have known him for many years. For any
government in the world it would be difficult to deal with him
because he's a radical.

Paul Eedle: So the KDP's action in Arbil had been prepared
over many months, and the KDP appeal to Iraq was not a sudden act of
desperation?

Heino Kopietz: Indeed, it was not a sudden act of
desperation. Barzani had an agreement with Mr Talabani since 1992 and
the proof of the pudding is that Mr Barzani agreed for the Iraqi oil
minister to cross KDP-held territory in January 1996 for the express
purpose to reopen the pipelines between Baghdad and Turkey. In return
for this permission, Mr Barzani received at the minimum 18 armoured
personnel carriers, unknown quantities of ammunition and some
intelligent military personnel. I do not know what else he obtained.

Paul Eedle: And the Americans knew about these contacts
between the KDP and Baghdad?

Heino Kopietz: Yes. The Americans had known for AT LEAST
the last year, that is the summer of 1995 until now, and I stress AT
LEAST, about the contacts between Mr Barzani and Mr Tareq Aziz. I
know personally the go-between in this. His meeting took place in
February 1996. And considering there is a station of some 50 CIA
agents in Salahuddin, it would be almost criminal if they had not
known - a station that is 100 metres from Mr Barzani's compound.

Paul Eedle: What was the benefit to the Iraqi government of
the agreement with the KDP?

Heino Kopietz: The benefit was very simple. It gave a
licence under the cover of the KDP to reenter legitimately northern
Iraq above the 36th parallel.

Paul Eedle: What sort of a person is Massoud Barzani?

Heino Kopietz: Massoud Barzani, it must be remembered, is
the head and senior son of the legendary Mullah Barzani. He himself
is very quiet, a non-drinker, non-smoker. That is his outward
appearance. What he is in public is essentially a conspirator in the
tradition of Kurdish politics. He himself had lived in Iran until
1991. .. and he himself had to learn what he is leading. He was a man
who did not know his own people but had to learn very fast. He is a
very shy man, a very elegant man in Kurdish terms, and importantly,
he wears always traditional clothes, unlike Jalal Talabani. He always
presents himself as the leader of the traditional families of
Kurdistan. His brother died at the end of the 80s and he inherited
the mantle of Mullah Barzani. There are other sons from other women,
but his mother is the one that counts and he inherited the mantle
when his brother died.

Paul Eedle: After the Gulf War ended in 1991 the Kurds were
enabled by the West to set up an autonomous administration with an
elected parliament. Why do you think this experiment collapsed?</P>

Heino Kopietz: The Kurds are their own worst enemies.
Indeed, the Kurds were given the chance to present themselves as a
so-called democratic experiment and I was one of the advisers from
1990 before the war in that experiment. There are deep-seated
conflicts within Kurdish society, you may call it tribal, religious,
ideological differences, but the basic contest between Jalal Talabani
and Massoud Barzani is over money and power. It is very sad for me to
say that as one of those involved but the families of the leaders are
nepotistic. Every single adviser to each leader are relatives and it
is sad they could not produce a consensus. The basic problem is a
lack of institutions and that is the fault of the Iraqi political
system.

Paul Eedle: The KDP's Burhan Jaf said last night his party
wanted a peace agreement with the PUK and a return to the
parliamentary democracy set up after the Gulf War. Do you think this
can be achieved, and if so, how?

Heino Kopietz: Unfortunately the leaders persist in living
in a never-never land and have not yet been able to come out of their
misperception of international politics. So there can be no return to
democracy. In fact democracy never really existed.

Paul Eedle: The Turkish government said today that it would
like to establish a 'security zone' inside northern Iraq to prevent
cross-border attacks by the Turkish Kurds of the PKK. What is the
relationship between the PKK and the Iraqi Kurdish groups?

Heino Kopietz: The Turkish Kurdish problem is far removed
from the Iraqi, Iranian and Syrian Kurds. The PKK under Mr Ocalan has
taken a very different route to autonomy, independence or whatever
you may want to call it. He has decided to take a violent course...
Turkey looks at all Kurds as interrelated, as one ethnic
group,therefore they see Kurds in Iraq, Iran and Syria as the same as
the PKK. The PKK's ties to Iraqi groups vary from time to time.
Sometimes they're close to the PUK, sometimes to the KDP but they all
fight each other. There are tactical alliances. It all depends on the
regional political constellation at any one time.

Paul Eedle: How will the Iraqi oil-for-food deal affect the
Kurds in northern Iraq? Which groups stand to benefit from it?

Heino Kopietz: I will be very cynical. No group in Iraq
will benefit because all oil for food contracts will be delivered to
Tikrit. That's why the United States, Britain and many others are
holding back. About 70 percent of all past humanitarian aid to Iraq
always ended up in the city of Tikrit, from where Saddam comes.

Paul Eedle: Could you already see this crisis brewing when
you visited Kurdistan earlier this year? What were the signs on the
ground then?

Heino Kopietz: It became very clear to me as far back as
January 1995 when the PUK decided unilaterally to invade and adopt
Arbil. Later the fighting between these groups, be it for tribal
reasons or ideological reasons, was a very clear sign. In January
1996 it also became clear that the American confrontation with Iran
was heading towards a crescendo. We knew that the Kurds have been and
will be the football of Middle Eastern power struggles.
Unfortunately, the Kurds permit themselves to be in that role.

Paul Eedle: Now that Saddam's forces have been able to
enter the Kurdish areas, do you think they will stay permanently? For
instance, do you believe reports that Iraqi intelligence agents are
still in Arbil in force and likely to remain there?

Heino Kopietz: First, Iraqi Arab intelligence agents always
have been in north Iraq. Second, if one has a division of uniform
military personnel of whatever number and size, then half of them
will be intelligence services. When the tanks and the uniform
regiments return they will leave behind half of their men and
equipment. There's no doubt that half of those who came in were left
behind as intelligence. These men have very specific tasks, to root
out the opposition to the KDP, say PUK supporters, and in my
knowledge there will be at least 2-5,000 intelligence officers in the
KDP's regions in order to finish the PUK. The whole purpose of the
exercise was to eliminate Jalal Talabani and his PUK and that they
will do now with a vengeance and great ruthlessness.

Paul Eedle: How do you predict that the situation will
develop over the next three to six months?

Heino Kopietz: Kurdistan is a political vacuum right now
and it has been a vacuum for at least five years if not before. I'm
not a prophet, I cannot say what will happen. I can only say what
could happen. Turkey and Iran both have strategic reasons to be in
the region. Iraq will resist this, and as a member of the United
Nations, Saddam Hussein has every right to defend the territorial
integrity of Iraq. Yet it is very possible that Turkey and Iran will
interfere with this because they see the oil and gas advantages. The
game is all about money and power in this region.

Paul Eedle: Do you think there is a risk of a refugee
crisis like that of 1991 caused by the present conflict in Kurdistan?

Heino Kopietz: The Kurdish population is so frightened and
so insecure, the answer to your question is definitely yes. We will
have another crisis, human rights crisis, if the Americans will push
the confrontation with Arab Iraq further... The Kurds will flee again
and the Kurds will yet again suffer but this will not only be due to
Western powers but to Kurdish leaders.

Paul Eedle: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Kopietz, for
joining OutThere today for this live interview.

(Ends)




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Solidaritygroup Turkey-Kurdistan
Memberorganisation of Foundation Initiativegroup Kurdistan
P.O. Box 85306
3508 AH Utrecht
The Netherlands
stk at schism.antenna.nl
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